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Kwame Kilpatrick Lawyer Answers Back

Detroit Ex Mayor

Attorney Daniel D. Hajji and Kwame Kilpatrick talk during a Restitution Court Proceeding

There comes a time when one must wonder why people do what they do.  Here we have the case of the Wayne County Prosecutor. She was relentless in her pursuit of former Mayor of Detroit Kwame Kilpatrick, who lied to a Wayne County jury about his having an affair with one of his aides. As result, Mr. Kilpatrick lost a lot. He lost his position as Mayor of the City of Detroit. He was disbarred from the practice of law; He spent a number of months in jail; He was disgraced; his status was destroyed; and he became a pariah.

He had to leave Michigan to obtain employment. Mr. Kilpatrick, after his release from jail, was placed on five years’ reporting probation. As a result of his felony convictions, he is forbidden from seeking election to any public office. He is required to pay the sum of $1 million by the end of his 5-year probation period.

There are those who think he did not suffer enough. There are those who wanted him to rot in Jackson Prison for many years. There are others who wished him and his family to be ruined irreparably. Invective was spewed at him by those who wished him ill-will. The worst are those who injected folklore allegations for their personal gain. However, Kwame Kilpatrick is not one to allow adversity to keep him down. He is essentially an optimist who seeks to make the best out of whatever condition in which he finds himself.

Thus, having suffered losses which might have annihilated a lesser man, Mr. Kilpatrick moved to Texas. Instead of being employed at a minimum wage job, he has a decent salary; instead of working in a hostile environment, he has a nice job selling complex computer equipment to the health care industry and a nice office in a nice building. Instead of living in a decrepit part of town, he lives in a nice community. Instead of driving a battered, used car, he drives a nice vehicle. His children attend nice public schools in a good school district. In short, he has managed to prevent the total destruction to which many who have been convicted of felonies are consigned.

There are those who resent the fact that Mr. Kilpatrick is not living in a cardboard box on Woodward Avenue. There are others who are bitter that he does not have to scrounge garbage cans in search of food. These people have a decided antipathy towards Mr. Kilpatrick. Many of them are mean-spirited. Many of them wallow in hatred. Too many of them are so blinded by their loathing of Mr. Kilpatrick that they believe he is doing wrong when the facts of which they are aware show the exact opposite.

Now there are questions about his “lifestyle.” Is there anything in the law or in his sentence which dictates the type of house in which he lives or the vehicle which he drives?

Mr. Kilpatrick is a debtor who owes the City of Detroit $1 million, less the money which already has been paid in restitution. Where restitution is required as part of a criminal sentence, the earnings subject to garnishment can be no more onerous to the probationer/debtor than would be the case of one who was a debtor based upon a civil judgment.

Now, the Prosecutor, who has political ambitions beyond her present position which may place her on the ballot in next year’s general election, is seeking to have the Mr. Kilpatrick hauled before this Court. She claims that he has “flagrantly” violated probation orders. Yet, the truth is that he is in compliance with those orders, even though those orders are not in compliance with the law. The Prosecutor makes accusations claiming lack of compliance, the following is alleged:

  • a. The Prosecutor claims that the $3,000.00 that Mr. Kilpatrick paid on September 16, 2009 was “exactly half of the payment he was ordered to make monthly.” False!  Mr. Kilpatrick’s plea agreement and sentence did not require that any monthly payments be made. On March 10, 2009, the Court Ordered Mr. Kilpatrick to pay $6,000.00 a month for the first six months of his employment. That was accomplished when the August payment was made. Thereafter, pursuant to that same Court Order, Mr. Kilpatrick was ordered to pay 30% of his monthly income. His income was reduced to $10,000.00 per month because he did NOT receive any draws from his Employer. Thus, he was required to pay $3,000.00 for the restitution on the $10,000.00 income. If the Prosecutor read the order march 2009 before making accusations that Mr. Kilpatrick “flagrantly” violated this Court’s orders, she would not be in a position to claim any legitimacy to her accusation. She received the Court’s March 10, 2009 order at the time it was issued. She has known for a full 6 months that the 30% garnishment would be adjusted according to the Mr. Kilpatrick’s income. Moreover, she knew that Mr. Kilpatrick’s income would be reduced after 6 months once the advances on future pay ceased, pursuant to the letter of March 2, 2009, which Mr. Kilpatrick’s employer sent to the Court. At the latest, that letter was sent to the Prosecutor 2½ weeks before she made the accusation against Mr. Kilpatrick; however, it is believed that she received a copy in March, 2009. In any event, at the time of the Prosecutor’s Motion, dated September 23, 2009, and signed by her, the Prosecutor was fully aware that the $6,000.00 payment was no longer applicable.

Query: given the fact that the Prosecutor was in possession of documentation establishing that the $3,000.00 payment was not in contravention of this Court’s orders, why did she make the false accusation that Mr. Kilpatrick was “flagrantly” violating this Court’s orders by paying the $3,000.00 September restitution payment?

  • b. The Prosecutor claims that other than his last two pay stubs from his employer, Mr. Kilpatrick failed to disclose financial information to the probation department or this Court. False. In February, 2009, Mr. Kilpatrick made a full disclosure to this Court and the probation department of his assets. Either the Prosecutor has no knowledge as to the facts which are applicable to the issue of Mr. Kilpatrick’s disclosure of his financial information, in which case the Motion should not have been filed because there was a lack of a proper grounding in fact to provide a foundation for her claims; or she was aware that Mr. Kilpatrick had provided financial disclosure in February, 2009, as a result of which she made a knowingly false statement to the Court. In the first situation, she would be failing to possess knowledge of which one in her position should be aware; in the other, she is willing to disregard facts which are not convenient for her personal ambitions. In either case, a serious question arises as to whether the Prosecutor is so blinded by her animus toward Mr. Kilpatrick and by her own personal interests that she is failing to perform her responsibilities in a professional and appropriate manner.
  • c. The Prosecutor claims that Mr. Kilpatrick has violated the Court’s orders by failing to disclose the assets of his spouse, Carlita Kilpatrick. Such assumes that Mr. Kilpatrick is in possession of such information. Certainly, one can only disclose that of which one is aware. However, the Prosecutor has not set forth the basis upon which she claims that Mr. Kilpatrick has the information which is sought. If all the Prosecutor has in support of her claim that Mr. Kilpatrick “flagrantly” violated this Court’s orders is supposition, assumption, guesswork and conjecture, such do not constitute facts. In order to claim that Mr. Kilpatrick has violated the Court’s orders, whether “flagrantly” or not, the Prosecutor must have facts upon which to base the claim that Mr. Kilpatrick did not make disclosures of information in his possession. In other words, the Prosecutor must make disclosures of the basis upon which she claims that Mr. Kilpatrick did not make disclosures. This has not been done.
  • d. The Prosecutor claims that Mr. Kilpatrick has not made disclosure of assets held for Mr. Kilpatrick by third-persons. What assets? What third persons? The Prosecutor does not identify any such assets or persons. If the Prosecutor knows of such assets or persons, she should disclose the same. If not, it is unprofessional and improper to make such an accusation.
  • e. The Prosecutor claims that Mr. Kilpatrick has failed to disclose gifts or benefits received. Obviously, such is not true. Mr. Kilpatrick disclosed certain gifts for which he was required to forfeit 30% of said gifts’ imputed value. This has been known to the Prosecutor for several months. If there are gifts which Mr. Kilpatrick received other than those disclosed by Mr. Kilpatrick, the Prosecutor should reveal the same. There has been no basis to claim that a third-person is paying for any of the costs for Mr. Kilpatrick to live in a residence in Texas. The Prosecutor should be in possession of facts which support a conclusion that Mr. Kilpatrick is receiving a gift from a third-person, rather than basing the same upon an assumption. The fact that the lease for the residence in which Mr. Kilpatrick is living may be in someone else’s name does not mean that Mr. Kilpatrick is not making payments on the same. The Prosecutor simply assumes certain facts rather than being in possession of them. This appears to be a pattern—rather than being possessed of facts to form a foundation for the motion, the Prosecutor makes assumptions. Clearly, assumptions are no substitute for facts.
    A motion should be well grounded in fact. By signing the Motion, the Prosecutor has certified that it is well grounded in fact. It is difficult to comprehend how the Prosecutor, in filing this Motion in the absence of facts establishing a good-faith basis for such a motion, comported herself with the requirements of the Court Rules. It should be remembered that, under MCR 6.002, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as set forth under Chapter 6 of the Michigan Court Rules, are intended to promote a just determination of every criminal proceeding. They are to be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.Such is in keeping with the purpose of MCR 2.114, which the Prosecutor appears to have violated.
  • f. The Prosecutor also claims that Mr. Kilpatrick failed to report the benefits wherein his legal expenses for criminal defense were paid for by a third party. Such a claim is specious. First, the requirement to report gifts and other benefits was first set forth in this order march 2009. Thus, the payment of fees, which occurred prior to March 10, 2009, was not required.
    Moreover, this issue was reported over five (5) months ago in The Detroit News of April 9, 2009, wherein it was disclosed that prior to his taking his plea or being sentenced, Mr. Kilpatrick’s re-election committee paid legal expenses for Mr. Kilpatrick’s criminal defense. The newspaper reported that according to records filed with the Wayne County Clerk Elections Division, the last such payment was made on September 2, 2008. Such records are public records which have been available to the Prosecutor, the Court and anyone who is interested. A major business newspaper, on July 10, 2009, reported that although Michigan campaign finance laws relating to allowable expenditures of campaign funds are vague, the Wayne County Clerk determined that the expenses were proper. Inasmuch as the expenditures were made prior to any plea, prior to the sentence, and prior to the March 10, 2009 order of this Court, and have been reported fully in the media and scrutinized by the Michigan Secretary of State and the Wayne County Clerk, it is difficult to understand why the Prosecutor is alleging that such constitutes a violation of this Court’s orders. This appears to be yet another instance in which the Prosecutor is making baseless accusations when no impropriety has occurred.
  • g. The Prosecutor makes the silly claim that Mr. Kilpatrick has not assigned the bond which he posted at the time of his arraignment. The bond is on deposit with the Court. If the Prosecutor provided Mr. Kilpatrick with the paperwork to have the assignment made, he would sign the same. If the Prosecutor were truly interested in having proceeds of the bond turned over to the City of Detroit, the Prosecutor could have made a motion with this Court for the bond to be forfeited to the City of Detroit, inasmuch as Mr. Kilpatrick already agreed to the same. However, in the 11 months since the bond was to have been turned over to the City of Detroit, the Prosecutor has done nothing except to cast blame on others for her own neglect in presenting paperwork to Mr. Kilpatrick or otherwise filing a motion with this Court to have the bond forfeited to the City of Detroit. It seems that the Prosecutor is more interested in casting blame on Mr. Kilpatrick than in securing restitution for the City of Detroit.
  • h. The Prosecutor also claims that Mr. Kilpatrick has failed to make assignments of his Michigan and Detroit pensions to the City of Detroit. Once again, Mr. Kilpatrick has not been presented with paperwork by either of the two pension systems. Apparently, the Michigan system requires some procedural activities to be undertaken before they are prepared to present paperwork to Mr. Kilpatrick. The delay in the Detroit pension system’s presentation of paperwork to Mr. Kilpatrick is unknown. Neither the plea nor the sentence called for Mr. Kilpatrick’s Detroit pension to be forfeited.

In conclusion, the Prosecutor’s Motion is based upon statements which are false. The entire premise for relief stems from untruths. In the real world, where untrue statements entitle the purveyor of the falsehoods to nothing, a request for relief would be denied upon discovery of the falsehoods. There is no reason why such result should not occur in this forum. Mr. Kilpatrick’s restitution payments were dropped consistent with the Court Order. In that order, it states that his payment would be adjusted to 30% of his wages after the first 6 months. So, in the first 6 months, his wages (and Employment draws) were  $20,000 per month, thus he was required to pay $6,000 per month. In that same Order, it states that after 6 months his restitution payment would be adjusted in accordance to his wages; so when his wages dropped from $20,000 to $10,000 per month, so too should his restitution amount, i.e.,  30% of $10,000 (monthly wage) = $3,000. This is a simple mathematical equation even a 5th-Grader can figure out.

Daniel D. Hajji , Attorney for Kwame Kilpatrick, 30300 Northwestern Hwy., Farmington Hills, MI 48334, (248) 865-4700


Kwame Kilpatrick- Restitution of Gross Income

20091117234639_2009-1117-jg-Kilpatrick-336sAttorney Daniel D. Hajji, Farmington Hills, MI (248) 865-4700

You don’t need to be a mathematical genius to figure out the Restitution Order of March 2009 because it’s very simple: 30% of $10,000 equals $3,000. Is there anything in the law or in his sentence which dictates the type of house in which he lives or the vehicle which he drives? Is it a crime for a person on probation to receive gifts? There is no dispute as to the amount of restitution Mr. Kilpatrick has agreed to pay, e.g., $1 million. Further, there is no dispute what the Restitution Order of March 2009 says as to how this amount is to be repaid, i.e., 30% of his GROSS INCOME due by the 15th of each month for a minimum of 5 years.

To understand why the restitution payment dropped from $6,000 to $3,000.00 is to simply read the  COURT ORDER . It is not a number Mr. Kilpatrick picked out of nowhere– it was via Court Order. If you don’t care to read the 6-paged Court Order of Restitution, here is a brief summation:

  • Mr. Kwame Kilpatrick is to pay 30% of his GROSS WAGES (before income taxes are taken out) until the 1 Million dollars is reached. He has at ‘minimum’ 5 years to do this (March 2014). (Note: From March 2009 to date, he has paid close to $100,000– how many probationers in the City have done this? NONE).
  • At the time the order was signed, the Court was made aware that Mr. Kilpatrick was receiving $20,000/month from his sales job at Covisint. This $20,000/month represents $10,000 from his base salary plus $10,000 as an advance on his future commissions (but only for the first 6 months).
  • The ORDER states that he MUST pay 30% of his GROSS wages towards restitution. (The Court calculated $20,000 x 30% = $6,000).
  • The ORDER further stated that after 6 months, the $6,000 payment shall be adjusted to reflect 30% of his gross wages).
  • So after 6 months, Mr. Kilpatrick’s base salary adjusted to $10,000 per month ($10,000 x 30% = $3,000). The Court was made aware of this adjustment several times prior these proceedings. Never did Mr. Kilpatrick state that he could not pay 30% of his income towards restitution. In fact, he has been paying all of his required monthly payments to date.

It’s a simple mathematical equation even a 5th grader can figure out!

Mr. Kilpatrick has ‘moved on’ with his life. He is Gainfully employed and desires nothing more than to get rid of this resitution obligation hanging over his head.


Kwame Kilpatrick Hearing Nov. 17, 2009

Detroit Ex MayorAttorney: Daniel D. Hajji, (248) 865-4700

1.  Judge declares that the Prosecutors misrepresented documents on October 29, 2009 by inflating deposits and withdrawls from Kwame and his family bank accounts.

2. The Prosecution called an attorney for Compuware to the witness-stand. He testified that he drafted the loan agreements and promissory note. He further testified that the original loan was in the amount of $300k by 5 businessmen but then changed to $240k by 4 businessmen. The witness attorney further testified that the loans given by the 4 businessmen were loans calling for 6% interest, payable in quarterly installments starting in 2010. The Prosecution contends that the loans are an asset; and because every asset has a liability, the loans are income. This is wrong. Loans are not assets nor are they income by any means, therefore, any loans Kwame received is not subject to the 30% of his GROSS income witholding to pay towards his restitution payment.

3. Kwame continues to state that he has complied with the March 10, 2009 order. In fact, he has paid over $96,000.00 since the start of his restution order (7 months ago). See below for complete 6-page order signed by the Judge on March 10, 2009.


Order of Restitution March 10, 2009

Attorney Daniel D. Hajji, (248) 865-4700

Click here for Kwame Kilpatrick’s  March 10, 2009 Order of Restitution


Kwame Kilpatrick’s Response to Prosecutor’s Discovery Motion

courtroom me kwame and mikeAttorneys: Daniel D. Hajji & Michael Alan Schwartz, (248) 865-4700

The Prosecutor has decided that she needs to put on a show.  She appears to have taken an undue interest in a particular defendant whom she has prosecuted, to wit: Kwame Kilpatrick.

It is not enough that he was compelled to give up his position as Mayor of Detroit.  It is not enough that he was compelled to surrender his license to practice law.  It is not enough that he is required to pay $1 million in restitution to the City of Detroit over the 5-year period of his probation, and that already he has paid over $80,000.00.  It is not enough that he has been compelled to leave Michigan in order to obtain employment.

The Prosecutor, in a most unusual move, has signed the motion and brief seeking discovery.  This is indicative of her obsession with Mr. Kilpatrick.  It is most unusual for the elected Prosecutor to sign any motions or briefs; that is why she has a staff of capable assistant prosecutors.

One must ask the following question: if the Prosecutor were permitted to engage in discovery under the Michigan Court Rules, why would she need to file this motion?  Another question is appropriate posed, to wit: since the Prosecutor, who, by filing this motion, acknowledges that the Court Rules do not allow her to engage in discovery, why has she engaged in discovery which she concedes she is not permitted to do?

Discovery in criminal cases is governed by MCR 6.201.  People v Phillips, 468 Mich 583, 587-588 (2003); People v Greenfield, 271 Mich App 442, 447 (2006). That Rule prohibits discovery of the type that the Prosecutor has engaged in and seeks by the Prosecutor’s Motion.  The only way that the Prosecutor can engage in discovery is pursuant to MCR 6.201(I), which provides as follows:

On good cause shown, the court may order a modification of the requirements and prohibitions of this rule.

Untruthful statements by the Prosecutor do not constitute good cause.  There are two untruthful statements in particular which are worthy of further analysis, to wit: (A) the false assertion that Mr. Kilpatrick’s $3,000.00 September restitution payment violates this Court’s March 10, 2009 order; and (B) the untruthful statement that Mr. Kilpatrick failed to disclose assets and expenses.

The Prosecutor’s Untruthful Statement That Mr. Kilpatrick’s $3,000.00 Restitution Payment in September Violates This Court’s Orders

In the plea agreement which both the Prosecutor and this Court approved, there was no provision for monthly forfeitures of Mr. Kilpatrick’s wages.  In the original sentence of October 28, 2008, no monthly wage forfeitures were ordered.

It was only on March 10, 2009, that this Court, being “concerned” about the fact that Mr. Kilpatrick was driving a nice vehicle [1] altered the sentence to require that Mr. Kilpatrick forfeit, on a monthly basis, 30% of his wages and other items, such as gifts or “benefits.” [2].  In that March 10, 2009 order, this Court provided as follows:

THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS that Defendant pay restitution of $6,000.00 per month for the first six months of employment with Covisint.  This amount is based on Defendant’s known assets and income is calculated on a 30% scale of Defendant’s gross monthly income.  Therefore as an example, if Defendant’s income goes up or down after six months, the restitution amount shall be adjusted to reflect 30% of his gross monthly income.  Restitution must be paid by the 15th of the month for the preceding month’s restitution amount. [Emphasis supplied.]

Mr. Kilpatrick’s seventh month of employment began in August, 2009 [3]. Commencing with that month, pursuant to the explicit terms of the March 10, 2009 order, if his income increased or decreased, the restitution forfeiture automatically adjusted to reflect a 30% forfeiture of the new amount.  Thus, after the first six months, when the amount he received was decreased from $20,000.00 per month to $10,000.00 per month, the amount of the monthly restitution payment went from $6,000.00 to $3,000.00 by virtue of the specific, self-executing language contained in the March 10 order.

The Prosecutor also makes an untruthful statement when she falsely alleged that “after being warned not to modify his payments of restitution, he cut his last payment in half.”  Prosecutor’s Brief, p. 2.  There is nothing in any communication to Mr. Kilpatrick which “warned him not to modify his payments.”  In fact, this Court’s March 10, 2009 order authorizes such modification after the first six months.  Mr. Kilpatrick’s payment of $3,000.00 in September was made based upon the exact language of this Court’s March 10, 2009 order, utilizing the precise formula contained in that order.

The Prosecutor knows that Mr. Kilpatrick was in compliance with this Court’s March 10 order in making the $3,000.00 payment.  This Court is in possession of independent confirmation of Mr. Kilpatrick’s change in pay based upon Mr. Kilpatrick’s last two pay stubs, which were given to this Court.  This Court previously received a letter dated March 2, 2009, from Brett Furst, Vice-President of Covisint, wherein this Court was informed by Mr. Furst as follows:

I also understand that you have questions about Mr. Kilpatrick’s compensation.  Mr. Kilpatrick’s annual base salary is $120,000.  This means that his gross base pay is $10,000 per month.  He is currently receiving an additional $10,000 per month in a recoverable draw, which is an advance on future expected commission earnings.  It is common for new Covisint sales executives to receive such a draw for a period of time upon beginning employment.  Mr. Kilpatrick’s recoverable draw will continue for the next six (6) months.  Therefore, for the next six (6) months, Mr. Kilpatrick will receive $20,000 in gross pay or $14,133.80 net per month after taxes.  After the first six months of his employment, Mr. Kilpatrick will no longer receive a draw, and thus his gross base salary will be $10,000 per month or $7,906.44 per month after taxes.

Accordingly, this Court was informed by Mr. Kilpatrick’s employer, prior to the March 10, 2009 order, that Mr. Kilpatrick’s pay would be reduced by half after his first six months of employment.

By letter of September 4, 2009, as a courtesy to this Court, counsel for the Mr. Kilpatrick reminded the Court that, the first six months of employment having elapsed, Mr. Kilpatrick’s pay had been cut in half.  Mr. Kilpatrick’s counsel attached a copy of Mr. Furst’s March 2, 2009 letter so that this Court would not need to search its own records to retrieve the confirmation of such pay change.  A copy of the September 4, 2009 letter, containing Mr. Furst’s letter, was sent to the Prosecutor’s office.

This Court, and any rational person who reads this Court’s March 10, 2009 order, and who has the information which this Court and the Prosecutor possess that Mr. Kilpatrick’s pay was cut in half after six months, know that the Prosecutor’s accusation is false.  Pursuant to said order, Mr. Kilpatrick’s September restitution payment was automatically reduced from $6,000.00 to $3,000.00.  Given the language of that order, no amendment of that order was required to authorize the reduction in restitution payment.

Untruthful statements can never constitute good cause for any court of justice to grant any relief to the speaker of those untruths.

The Prosecutor’s Untruthful Statement That Mr. Kilpatrick Failed to Make Disclosures of Assets and Expenses

The Prosecutor, continuing the pattern of making statements which are untrue, claims that Mr. Kilpatrick has not disclosed his assets and his receipt of gifts or “benefits.”

In her companion Motion to Modify the Terms of Probation and to Determine Appropriate Restitution Payments for Defendant, Kwayme Kilpatrick, which also bears the elected Prosecutor’s signature, and which is referenced in ¶¶8 and 9 of the Prosecutor’s Motion for Discovery, the Prosecutor makes the following statement:

The Defendant has failed to disclose to the Court or the probation department any/all assets that are in his name.  The only financial information that he has disclosed to date is two recent pay stubs from his employer.  No other financial information has been provided to the court.

The Court has personal knowledge that this statement by the Prosecutor is untrue.  The Court knows that the probation department received a dossier from Mr. Kilpatrick, on or about February 27, 2009, containing disclosures of financial assets.   The Prosecutor was aware that the probation department prepared a case report, dated February 27, 2009, which was delivered to this Court, containing information concerning Mr. Kilpatrick’s assets and expenditures.  All parties were aware that the Court required such disclosures before it would grant Mr. Kilpatrick permission to go to work in Texas.  The probation department’s case report, cited in this Court’s March 10, 2009 Opinion and Order, was based upon these disclosures.

The Court, the Prosecutor, and the general public were all aware that after Mr. Kilpatrick was sentenced to 120 days in the Wayne County Jail on October 28, 2008, he was incarcerated for over 3 months during which time he was unable to work or earn an income.  After he was released from jail on February 3, 2009,  he sought and obtained employment in Texas.  The Court required disclosure of the financial matters as a condition precedent to his being permitted to leave Michigan for Texas.  It was only after financial disclosures were made by Mr. Kilpatrick that the Court permitted him to travel to Texas.  This should be no surprise to the Prosecutor.

Given the foregoing, which is all a matter of record, the Court has personal knowledge that the Prosecutor’s statement that “[t]he only financial information that [Mr. Kilpatrick] has disclosed to date [i.e. September 23, 2009] is two recent pay stubs from his employer” is untrue.

There are only three reasonable explanations as to why the Prosecutor has told untruths, to wit: (1) she knows the truth and has decided to disregard the same for personal reasons, best known to her; or (2) she does not know the truth, in derogation of her duties and responsibilities as Wayne County Prosecutor, because she has not familiarized herself with the information that she is supposed to know as part of her job; or (3) she has been so shaken by one senior assistant prosecutor’s having been charged with felonies involving perjury and conspiracy; another senior assistant prosecutor’s being demoted due to significant unethical conduct with a subordinate; and other internal problems in her office, that she cannot cope with the deluge of problems.

For purposes of this motion, it matters not which explanation is correct.  She has engaged in a pattern of untruthful statements [4] which she has submitted to this Court as a basis for claiming good cause for the granting of her motion.

The Prosecutor’s Illegal Discovery Actions

The Prosecutor is well aware that MCR 6.201, which governs discovery in criminal cases, does not permit her to engage in discovery which is not specifically allowed under that Rule, unless the Court, pursuant to MCR 6.201(I), should find that good cause exists to modify the requirements and prohibitions of the Rule.

It is for that reason that the Motion for Discovery was filed.  However, Mr. Kilpatrick has become aware that the Prosecutor has engaged in illicit discovery without this Court’s authorization, in which subpoenæ has been served on financial institutions, individuals and others.  Mr. Kilpatrick was served with a subpoena.   A subpoena may be issued only in accordance with MCR 2.506, 2.305, 2.621(c), 9.112(D), 9.115(I)(1), or 9.212.  See MCR 2.506(A)(3).  MCR 2.621(c), 9.112(D), 9.115(I)(1) and 9.212 are not applicable to the proceedings in this matter.  A subpoena issued under MCR 2.506 are returnable in court for a hearing or trial.  The subpoenæ issued by the Prosecutor were returnable to her office, not to this Court.  That leaves MCR 2.305, which are discovery subpoenæ for depositions.  The Prosecutor’s subpoenæ duces tecum were issued under MCR 2.305, if they were issued under any of the Rules set forth in MCR 2.506(A)(3) [5]. Pursuant to MCR 2.305(A)(5), copies of said subpoena were supposed to have been served on Mr. Kilpatrick.  They were not so served.  Pursuant to MCR 2.305(A)(1), notices of deposition were to have been served on the Mr. Kilpatrick.  They were not so served.

It is obvious that the Prosecutor has engaged in the illicit issuance of subpoenæ duces tecum in the absence of an order of this Court, pursuant to MCR 6.201(I).  Such subpoenæ duces tecum are invalid, not having been issued pursuant to law.  Any information derived from the issuance of said subpoenæ duces tecum should be suppressed as having been obtained in violation of law.

However, even here there has been actions by the Prosecutor which appear to have been designed to sidestep the law.  The Prosecutor has petitioned the court for the issuance of investigative subpoenæ under MCL 767A.2.  In that petition, it is necessary for the Prosecutor to identify a felony being investigated; the identity of the person who will be questioned or who will be required to produce records, documents or physical evidence to be examined; and a description of said records, document or physical evidence.  Under these circumstances, it would appear that either (1) the Prosecutor is utilizing investigative subpoenæ as a substitute for subpoenæ issued pursuant to MCR 2.506 and 2.305; or (2) the Prosecutor is claiming that a felony has been committed by Mr. Kilpatrick and the Prosecutor is preparing to initiate a new criminal case against Mr. Kilpatrick.

It should be noted that Defendant made the financial disclosures prior to the March 10, 2009 order.  Obviously, having made such disclosures in this matter, he is not required to undertake the useless exercise of again disclosing the same material subsequent to the March 10, 2009 order.

Next, he made such disclosures as are within the orders which the Court imposed.  Accordingly, although he received loans [6], which must be repaid, he did not disclose the same because loans are not income; neither are they gifts or benefits.  The receipt of a loan creates a liability.

The United States Supreme Court has held that “it is settled that receipt of a loan is not income to the borrower.”  Commissioner of Internal Revenue v Indianapolis Power & Light Co, 493 US 203, 207; 110 SCt 589, 592; 107 LEd2d 591, 598 (1990).  Mr. Kilpatrick’s income, since March 10, 2009, has been derived exclusively from payments received from his employer, Covisint.  That income has been reported.  He has not received any gifts or benefits since March 10, 2009 which have not been reported.

Accordingly, there is no basis for concluding that he has failed to report that of which he has knowledge.  With respect to any assets which his wife may have, Mr. Kilpatrick indicates that he is not privy to the same.  Clearly, one cannot report that which one does not know.  Moreover, the Prosecutor has failed entirely to demonstrate upon what basis, other than assumption, surmise, speculation and conjecture, she claims that Mr. Kilpatrick is privy to the assets of his spouse.

The Necessity of This Court’s Recusal

The Court is a witness to the fact that the Prosecutor’s purported factual statements are untruthful.  The Court (Judge) could properly be called to the witness stand to contradict the claims set forth by the Prosecutor in her untruthful statements.  The Court has personal knowledge of the untruthfulness of the Prosecutor’s statements. Under these circumstances, the Court must consider MCR 2.003(B)(2), which states as follows:

A judge is disqualified when the judge cannot impartially hear a case, including but not limited to instances in which:

The judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. The Court has personal knowledge of the disclosures made by Mr. Kilpatrick of his assets and expenses.  The Prosecutor claims that, other than the disclosure in September, 2009, of 2 pay stubs, Mr. Kilpatrick has failed to make any disclosure of financial information.  Mr. Kilpatrick states that he has made the requisite financial disclosures, and that such were made in February, 2009.  The Court has personal knowledge that Mr. Kilpatrick made the financial disclosures.

The Court must have disqualifed itself from the case. The Court has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding, to wit: whether Mr. Kilpatrick did or did not make disclosures of financial information other than presentation of his last two pay stubs.  As such, the Court must recuse itself pursuant to MCR 2.003(B)(2).


[1]

The vehicle is an American SUV, which was given to him as a gift, for which the purchase price was less than the list price of a Ford Taurus SHO.

[2]

This Court extracted 30% of the value of the vehicle from Defendant as a condition precedent of permitting him to go to work in Texas, where he obtained employment.  This Court also compelled payment of other money as a further condition precedent of allowing him to go to work.

[3]

As this Court’s March 10 Opinion and Order (p. 3) noted, Defendant was hired by Covisint on February 10, 2009.

[4]

In motions of this nature, in which facts are alleged, it is normal that such facts are supported by either exhibits, references to exhibits, or affidavits.  The Prosecutor has no such support for her factual averments.  It is probably best that she did not execute an affidavit with respect to her statements purporting to be factual.

[5]

If the Prosecutor’s subpoenæ duces tecum were not issued in accordance with MCR 2.506(A)(3), they are unauthorized by the Court Rules and are invalid.

[6]

The loans to Defendant were made in December, 2008 but were not received by him until after he was released from jail on February 3, 2009.  Part of the loan proceeds were received in February, 2009 and part in June, 2009.  None of these loans are income, gifts or benefits.  Accordingly, the loans were not required to be disclosed under the literal; language of the March 10, 2009 order.

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